Professor David Klinger, an expert on police shootings and a former police offer, sent me a copy of a lengthy report he conducted on the employment of SWAT teams submitted to the National Institution of Justice, entitled, “A MULTI-METHOD STUDY OF SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS TEAMS: FINAL REPORT.”

The report looked at statistical data from numerous teams nationwide that looked at the number of callouts, shootings, and the like over a 12 year period. At the peak year over 250 teams reported data. Some itnteresting facts emerge. SWAT teams do a variety of things, including hostage stand-offs, high risk warrant service, etc. Warrant service was the item that they performed the most, and the use of SWAT teams for this purpose increased throughout the 1990s, consistent with the criticisms of SWAT team lodged by civil liberties advocates.

But for all of these events there are comparatively few shootings. For instance, during the entire 12 year period, the teams reported 462 shootings (only 381 of which were at people). Of these, approximately 30% occurred during warrant-related service. During the relevant time frame 34,271 warrants were served. Not all of these shots were at people, i.e., some were suppressive fire and the like. So of all the shooting that took place in SWAT callouts, around 139 shootings took place in the course of 34,271 served warrants, or around .4% of the time. Even assuming all of these were unjustified–which is not a reasonable assumption–this number is fairly small.

Mistakes, negligent discharges, and other “bad shoots” were reported, for which teams and individuals are rightly criticized and held accountable. But if a shot is fired .04% of the time for all incidents during warrant service, this does not suggest that SWAT teams in general are trigger-happy or that they are frequently resorting to deadly force in an unreasonable, out-of-control fashion.

The report is unfortunately not available on line. I have, however, made a copy available to Radey Balko if he wishes to discuss its contents as they relate to his criticisms of SWAT teams. The next relevant comparison, of course, is to look at warrant service and other policework to see how much more often, if at all, regular cops employ deadly force in executing arrest and search warrants. This comparison would not be apples to apples, of course. SWAT would be expected to have a greater use of deadly force because of their high degree of employment in high risk situations. But it would provide some contex to see if the relatively low numbers of deadly force incidents involving SWAT are as low as they seem.