We got into a big long debate about relativism in an earlier thread about libertarianism. Some libertarians defended themselves from the charge of moral relativism by noting their strong belief in natural rights, as well as their belief in the possibility of contingent moral judgments that are real, but may change in the future as new information becomes available and as circumstances change.

Relativism is not necessarily the same thing as nihilism. One can be a relativist and have certain beliefs one lives by and wishes others would live by too. The essence of relativism is a belief that there is no certain moral knowledge true across time and cultures. Thus, a relativist might be pretty sure that polygamy is wrong in our culture, but he wouldn’t feel confident saying it’s wrong from some tribe of savages that continue to practice it. Likewise, a relativist might say that while we now know and believe it’s wrong to have slaves, people in the past thought otherwise, and because they earnestly believed in the practice, what they did cannot be said to be wrong. These two varieties, cultural and historical relativism, are probably just two of many.

Though not true for all libertarians, many libertarian philosophies are founded on a kind of limited relativism. That is, while these libertarians say there are universal and certain principles of natural rights that we can discern from the nature of man and government, we cannot obtain certain moral knowledge in other areas, particularly in areas without direct effects on others. Thus, while we can know with certainty it’s wrong to rob and murder and rape, we cannot know with any certainty that it’s wrong to engage in polygamy, drunkenness, or usury. And, moreover, that even if there were some consensus on any of these areas and one were reasonably confident of his judgment, it would be wrong to give government power over those areas because a moral principle of liberty would be offended, which gives each of us the right to do things that are bad for us so long as we don’t harm anyone else. To quote James Markels from one of the earlier discussions, “The truth of the matter is that there is no ‘right’ answer here [regarding abortion], and libertarianism allows individuals to decide this issue for themselves. This makes people on the Left and the Right rather nervous — what’s this about a political ideology letting its proponents think for themselves?” And James said that “libertarianism only defines what is “bad” (violation of individual rights), and then leaves it up to individuals to find their own good.”

I think there is a major theoretical problem with this view, even taken on its own terms, which I’ve tried my best to articulate above. The premise behind this kind of libertarianism is, in part, a lack of confidence that government can set up channels through legislation in which we can avoid harming ourselves and others by engaging in self-destructive behavior. The premise behind such morals legislation is that we can have reasonably certain moral knowledge and that such legislation, while it deprives individuals of a certain amount of freedom, does not do them harm, because the conduct in question is objectively harmful to them. Now the whole basis of such a “natural law” view is that we have a nature, the essentials of which can be understood (and have long been understood) and that we can know with some confidence what is harmful to individuals, even when their free will might compel them to harm themselves. The same understanding of nature which allows us to understand these things also allows us to understand the nature of rights. Both are founded on moral philosophy and a view of human nature and what is in its interests. This view would not necessarily be modifiable in the future because the nature of human action, responsibility, and purpose is known through introspection and observation; whether we’re more or less closely related to some chimpanzee is irrelevant. (Or I at least cannot imagine any kind of information coming to light that would require any significant revision to our thinking about morality, ethics, the meaning of life, etc.) My big question then is, if we cannot achieve any certain moral knowledge in the areas of traditional morals legislation, on what basis can we obtain any certain knowledge in the areas of libertarian concern, namely the traditional protection of life, liberty, and property and the restriction of government to protecting individuals from one another’s use of force and fraud? This question should be considered seperate from whether or not we choose as a prudential matter to enact and enforce such legislation, because, like libertarians, I think most such legislation is ill-advised, tendentious, or useless as a matter of policy.

The best libertarian defense to me is that in a world with dissensus about morality, it’s better to establish a strong consensus on limited government, as even if I have certain moral knowledge, I would not want to establish a precedent whereby my neighbor, with whom I certainly disagree, could constrain me in the manner he sees fit. But this is a much narrower view than the one I believe I have understood that says it would be wrong to ever have such legislation because we can never be certain that any of the behavior encompassed therein is actually and knowably wrong.